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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
A- Jurisdictional Statement 
Appellee Overland hereby adopts by reference the 
jurisdictional statement set forth in its original brief. 
B. Case History 
This action was originally filed by Plaintiffs Dale 
L. Larson, Grethe Larson and Systematic Builders, Inc. in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. (R. 002) Nearly three years after its original filing, 
the District Court granted a series of motions for partial 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants. (R. 845-847, 936-
940, 1018-1021). Plaintiff appealed the District Court's 
summary judgments, and oral arguments before the Utah Court of 
Appeals were held on June 20, 1991, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
Pursuant to such oral arguments, the Court of Appeals 
requested that supplemental briefs be filed by the parties 
regarding the application of LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 
P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991) to the case at bar. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
Both Appellants and Appellee Overland have 
recognized through their oral argument to this Court that a 
primary issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 
determining the lease to be a "true lease" as a matter of law 
rather than a security agreement, where there is no dispute as 
to lease terms or contents. Further supplemental arguments 
have been requested by this Court particularly regarding the 
application of LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d 189 (Utah 
App. 1991) to the lease characterization issue. The LMV 
Leasing opinion is set forth in its entirety in Addendum I 
herein. 
A- The District Court Correctly Determined The Lease 
Characterization Issues As a Matter of Law 
A trial court may render summary judgment only if 
there is no genuine issues as to any material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LMV 
Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah App. 1991); 
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light, 
776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
56(c). 
Moreover, the interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract is a question of law which does not require any 
particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of 
the contract. LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 
(Utah App. 1991) ; Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire and 
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Casualty Co. , 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). More 
specifically, a determination of whether an agreement is a 
lease or a secured sales agreement is a question of law when 
the analysis is based upon the language of the agreement 
itself and not upon extrinsic evidence. LMV Leasing, Inc. v. 
Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192-193 (Utah App. 1991); Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
In the instant case, the parties have not disputed 
the actual terms or contents of the lease, rather they dispute 
only the characterization of the document. Consequently, the 
District Court correctly characterized the undisputed and 
unambiguous lease as a matter of law rather than preserving 
such issue as a question of fact as urged by the Appellants. 
B. The Face of the Lease Presents No Dispositive Evidence 
Which Warrants Disregard of Lease Form 
In LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 194 
(Utah App. 1991), this Court stated: 
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an 
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the 
document itself. It should be looked at in its 
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of 
its parts should be given affect insofar as that is 
possible. 
(Citing Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 
P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Pursuant thereto, this 
Court should review the face language used by the parties as 
evidence of their intent that the agreement was a lease. See 
generally LMV Leasing, 805 P.2d at 194. 
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Review of the lease language herein supports the 
conclusion that the parties intended such document to 
constitute a lease. Specifically, the opening statement of 
the Lease provides that ffPFC, NLessor, ! hereby leases to 
xLessee,f the property described herein below according to the 
terms set forth.11 Moreover, Sections I and II set forth the 
definitions of the "leased property11 and the "lease term" 
respectively. PFC1 is consistently referred to as Lessor, and 
Appellant Dale L. Larson, in his capacity as dba L&L Wire EDM, 
is consistently denominated as Lessee. Furthermore, the 
itemized provisions of the Lease routinely refer to the 
payments made under the Lease as rental payments, and all 
references to the agreement itself denominate it as a lease. 
Finally, the Lease is executed by the parties in their 
respective capacities as "lessor" and "lessee." 
Consequently, initial inspection of the Lease 
language reveals characteristics and language strikingly 
similar to the lease scrutinized by the court in LMV Leasing 
and determined therein to be a true lease. 
c
« "Behind the Form" Analysis Reveals No Dispositive 
Evidence Contrary to Lease Status 
The LMV Leasing court further determined that f![i]n 
determining the nature of an agreement purporting to be a true 
lease, courts must [also] look behind the form of an agreement 
1Appellant Overland subsequently took over all interest, 
right and title of PFC in and to the lease. 
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to determine whether it is, in fact, a sales agreement with a 
reservation of a security interest in the vendor." LMV 
Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 194 (Utah App. 1991); 
see e.g. Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706, 709 (Utah 
1981) . As set forth in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
(!fUUCCff) and as recognized by the LMV Leasing court, "unless 
a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of 
title thereunder is not a "security interest." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-1-201(37) (1980) (emphasis added) (amended 1990); LMV 
Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 194-195 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larson Brothers Const. 
Co. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court set forth 
twelve relevant factors determined to be helpful in 
characterizing an agreement as a true lease or a security 
agreement. A portion of such factors constitute the sole 
basis upon which Appellants challenge the District Court's 
characterization of the Lease herein as a true lease. 
However, the LMV Leasing court noted that "in setting forth 
this list, the Supreme Court, by its own language did not 
purport to assemble an exhaustive list of factors that may be 
considered in characterizing a contract as a lease or as a 
security agreement." LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d 
189, 195 (Utah App. 1991). As in the true lease scrutinized 
in LMV Leasing, the Lease herein also reveals the presence of 
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several Colonial Leasing factors* Specifically, 
Appellant Lessee was required to provide insurance, pay taxes, 
and pay repair and maintenance costs for the leased equipment. 
The lease further includes default provisions regarding 
acceleration and resale. Moreover, Appellee Overland made no 
warranties regarding merchantability, fitness, design or 
quality. 
However, as in LMV Leasing, despite the presence of 
these several factors, other aspects of the lease demonstrate 
the clear intention of the parties that the lease was 
nevertheless intended to be a true lease agreement. LMV 
Leasing, 805 P.2d at 196. Specifically, there is no 
provision, either explicit or implicit, for the transfer of 
ownership of the vehicles to Appellant Lessee. "The prime 
essential distinction between a lease and a conditional sale 
is that in a lease the lessee never owns the property." LMV 
Leasing, 805 P. 2d at 196 (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted). Paragraph 9 of the instant Lease, specifically 
provides: 
Equipment is, and shall at all times remain, the 
property of lessor; and lessee shall have no right, 
title or interest therein or thereto except as 
expressly set forth in this lease. 
(See paragraph 9 of Addendum II) . Such retention of title in 
Appellee Overland, as subsequent lessor, is the "paramount 
attribute of a lease." LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P. 2d 
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189, 196 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Carlson v. Tandy Computer 
Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
Moreover, although the instant lease grants 
Appellant Lessee an option to purchase, unlike the lease 
scrutinized in LMV Leasing, such option by its terms also 
supports a lease characterization. Specifically, such option 
fails to fall within the objective standard set forth by the 
UUCC that an "option to become the owner of the property for 
no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration 
does make the lease one intended for security." Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1980) (amended 1990). In FMA Financial 
Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 801 (Utah 1979) the court 
declared that a comparison of the "option price to the fair 
market value of the property at the time the option is to be 
exercised is the most relevant in determining whether the 
option price is nominal." Where the option price is one equal 
to or greater than fair market value, such price is not to be 
considered nominal. 
Paragraph 11 of the Lease herein grants Appellant 
Lessor an option to purchase as follows: 
11. Lessee shall have an option to purchase 
Equipment at the end of the Lease for Fair Market 
Value at that time plus all obligations remaining 
due under this Lease. Notice of exercise of this 
option must be given in writing to Lessor or 
Lessor's assignee at least thirty days prior to the 
expiration of the Lease. This option shall 
terminate and be void upon termination of this Lease 
by reason of Lessee's default. 
(Addendum II, Paragraph 11 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the actual price for which the equipment 
was sold nearly four and one half years after its purchase and 
within six months of the actual lease expiration date was 
approximately fourteen percent (14%) of the actual sales 
price, (R. 963-964; Deposition of Robert John Lucking, 
Exhibit 5). 
Consequently, since (1) the instant Lease on its 
face purports to be a lease; (2) there is no express provision 
for transfer of ownership, and (3) the option to purchase 
could not be exercised for nominal considercition, there is no 
dispositive evidence that the parties intended to create a 
security agreement or transfer the functional equivalent of 
ownership. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is no dispositive indication on the face 
of the lease that the parties intended to execute a security 
agreement, this Court should defer to the language of the 
unambiguous instrument as the basis for its legal 
characterization. LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 
196 (Utah App. 1991) ; accord Carlson v. Tandy Computer 
Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 1986); American Standard 
Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 266 (5th 
Cir. 1981). Pursuant to the express lease language, the 
analysis of purpose and intentions of the parties as 
demonstrated by the lease provisions and the application of 
the principles set forth in LMV Leasing, this Court should 
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determine as a matter of law that the Lease herein constitutes 
a true lease. 
Consequently, Appellee Overland respectfully 
requests this Court to deny all aspects of Appellant's appeal 
regarding issues of lease characterization and commercial 
reasonableness of sale. 
Respectfully submitted this^l^ *~ day of June, 1991. 
ALLEN^NEiSON HARDY & EVANS 
leffrey M. Jones, Esq. 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
Robert L. Payne, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Overland Thrift & Loan 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ day of June, 
1991, I did mail a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE OVERLAND THRIFT & LOAN, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Joseph Bottums, Esq. 
BOTTUM, J.H. & ASSOCIATES 
136 South Main 
Suite #418 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main 
Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
<2-4&<?^—~ 
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ADDENDUM I 
- 1 0 -
LMV LEASING, INC. v. CONLIN 
Cite as 805 P.2d 189 (UtahApp. 1991) 
Utah 189 
ferent Since both parts of the Strickland 
test have been met, we hold that Templin 
was denied his constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART, 
DURHAM, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM £ 
LMV LEASING, INC., Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Val CONLIN, Barbara Conlin, Tubber T. 
Okuda, Mary Y. Okudst, and Roy W. 
Mallory, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 890504-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 16, 1991. 
Company which supplied cars to car 
rental business for use in business sued 
guarantors for amounts owed by car rental 
business after default in lease agreements. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Pat B. Brian, J., granted partial summary" 
judgment on issue of liability in favor of 
company. Guarantors appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) 
contractual agreement between company 
and car rental business was true lease, not 
security agreement subject to provisions of 
Uniform Commercial Code; (2) under provi-
sions of lease agreement, any failure to 
dispose of vehicles in commercially reason-
able manner upon default was not absolute 
bar to suit for resulting deficiency, and 
thus, disputed factual issues relating to 
such failure were not relevant to determin-
ing liability; (3) although Court of Appeals 
had serious reservations about procedure 
employed by trial court in deciding dam-
ages, error was waived on appeal absent 
timely objection in trial court; and (4) party 
seeking attorney's fees was not required to 
specify hourly rate billed by each attorney 
working on case in order to fully comply 
with applicable court rule. 
Affirmed. 
1. Secured Transactions <s=>10 
Determination of whether agreement 
is lease or secured sales agreement is ques-
tion of law when analysis is based upon a 
language of agreement itself and not upon 
extrinsic evidence. 
2. Secured Transactions <3=»10 
Contractual agreement between rental 
car business and company which provided 
automobiles was true lease, and not securi-
ty agreement, and within coverage of Uni-
form Commercial Code, where there was 
no dispositive indication on face of doc-
ument that parties intended to execute se-
curity agreement, and agreement contained 
no option to purchase, no provision for 
transfer of ownership of vehicles to car 
rental business and specifically provided 
for retention of title in lessor. U.C.A.1953, 
70A-1-201(37), 70A-9-102(l)(a). 
3. Bailment <s=>20 
Secured Transactions <^10 
If contract is true lease agreement, 
fundamental principles of contract law ap-
ply and liability for damages is established 
merely by showing breach of agreement's 
provisions; if agreement is security agree-
ment subject to Uniform Commercial Code, 
commercial reasonableness of disposition 
of collateral is prerequisite to bringing defi-
ciency action. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 
70A-9-102(l)(a), 70A-9-504(3). 
4. Secured Transactions <s=>10 
In determining nature of agreement 
purporting to be true lease, courts must 
look behind form of agreement to deter-
mine whether it is, in fact, sales agreement 
with reservation of security interest in ven-
dor; however, when interpreting court 
finds no dispositive evidence that parties 
intended agreement to be other than that 
what it purports to be by its unambiguous 
terms, courts should decline to construe 
190 Utah 805 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
agreement contrary to those terms. U.C. 
A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 70A-9-102(l)(a). 
5. Secured Transactions <§=,240 
Under provisions of lease agreement 
between car rental company and provider 
of automobiles, any failure to dispose of 
vehicles in commercially reasonable man-
ner was not absolute bar to suit for result-
ing deficiency, and thus, disputed factual 
issues relating to such failure were not 
relevant to determining liability upon de-
fault. 
6. Appeal and Error <S=>230 
Although Court of Appeals had serious 
reservations about procedure employed by 
trial court in deciding damages in breach of 
lease action based solely on affidavits and 
memoranda submitted simultaneously by 
both parties, error was not adequately pre-
served for appeal absent timely objection to 
procedure at trial and application of any 
recognized exceptions to general rule that 
failure to object in trial court waives error 
on appeal. 
7. Costs <3=>198 
Party seeking attorney fees was not 
required to specify hourly rate billed by 
each attorney working on case in order to 
comply with applicable court rule, so long 
as legal basis of attorney fee award, nature 
of work performed by attorneys, number 
of hours spent to prosecute claim, and 
some affirmation that fees charged were 
reasonable in light of comparable legal ser-
vices were included in party's affidavit in 
support of fees. Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-505(1). 
Val J. Conlin and Barbara Conlin (ar-
gued), Henderson, Nev., pro se. 
Steven W. Call (argued), Weston L. Har-
ris, Paul A. Hoffman, Watkiss & Saper-
stein, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and ap-
pellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Val and Barbara Conlin appeal from the 
trial court's decision finding them liable as 
guarantors for amounts owed to LMV 
Leasing, Inc. (LMV) by M.C.O., Inc. (MCO). 
Because MCO, as principal obligor under 
an agreement between it and LMV, de-
faulted in its obligations, LMV sued the 
Conlins and other individual guarantors to 
recover amounts owed it under the agree-
ment. The trial court granted LMV's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment as to 
the liability of the individual guarantors 
and ultimately entered final judgment for 
LMV. The Conlins appeal both the trial 
court's decision to grant LMV's partial 
summary judgment motion and its final 
judgment. We affirm. 
I. FACTS 
On December 29, 1986, LMV entered into 
a contract with MCO, a Utah corporation 
doing business as American International 
Rent-A-Car. The contract was entitled 
"PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE 
AGREEMENT" and anticipated a series of 
transactions by which LMV would provide 
MCO with automobiles for use in MCO's 
car rental business. The agreement named 
LMV as lessor and MCO as lessee. Ac-
cording to its provisions, LMV, as lessor, 
retained all "right, title or interest" in the 
automobiles except for MCO's right to use 
the vehicles in accordance with the agree-
ment. 
The terms of the agreement did not give 
MCO an option to purchase the vehicles 
after the termination of the lease agree-
ment, and neither party has alleged the 
existence of any oral provision to grant 
such an option to MCO. Under the agree-
ment, the lease for each vehicle terminated 
either upon default by MCO or at the con-
clusion of the base lease term. MCO was 
obligated to return the vehicles to LMV 
after termination. When MCO returned 
the vehicles, LMV was to sell the vehicles 
at wholesale in a commercially reasonable 
manner. After sale of the vehicles, MCO 
was entitled to any surplus funds received 
from the sale after the 
the cars was deducted from the net selling 
price. Similarly, MCO was obligated to 
pay LMV for any deficiency resulting after 
the book value of the sold vehicle was 
subtracted from the net selling price. 
The contract established a lease term of 
forty-eight months which could be termi-
nated at MCO's discretion subject only to 
the requirement of a twelve month mini-
mum lease term. The agreement specified 
that MCO could not extend the lease term 
for any vehicle beyond the initial forty-
eight months and that all tax benefits from 
ownership of the vehicles was reserved to 
LMV. Rent payments under the lease was 
the sum of two factors: the Agreed Price 
of the vehicles divided by the forty-eight 
month base lease term, and a "financing" 
amount2 The agreement expressly provid-
ed that LMV made no warranty regarding 
the merchantability, fitness, design, or 
quality of the leased vehicles. 
MCO had the sole responsibility for the 
maintenance and repair of the vehicles, as 
well as the obligation to pay title, licensing, 
registration and inspection fees. Liability 
for property, use, and sales taxes was also 
assigned to MCO. Additionally, MCO was 
obligated to obtain property and liability 
insurance and also agreed to indemnify 
.LMV for any claim arising out of or related 
to the operation of vehicles rented under 
the lease. Finally, the agreement included 
detailed provisions setting forth LMV's 
remedies in the event of default by MCO, 
among which was the option to accelerate 
the entire balance of future rent due. 
On January 26, 1987, the Conlins signed 
an agreement entitled "UNCONDITION-
AL AND IRREVOCABLE GUARANTY 
OF PAYMENT" by which they agreed per-
1. "Book value" is defined by the agreement as 
"the Agreed Price less the aggregate Monthly 
Depreciation." The Agreed Price is defined as 
"$100.00 over Dealer Invoice." The Monthly 
Depreciation is a constant amount calculated at 
the commencement of the lease by which the 
Agreed Price is reduced each month. Thus, 
book value properly may be described as the 
initial cost of the vehicle adjusted monthly by a 
constant depreciation factor. 
2. Rent payments were actually calculated, how-
ever, by adding several factors including the 
LMV LEASING, INC. v. CONLIN Utah 191 
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book value" l of sonally, unconditionally and irrevocably to 
guarantee the payment of any amounts due 
LMV from MCO in the event of MCO's 
default. In addition to the Conlins, three 
other individuals signed identically worded 
guaranty agreements.3 
MCO filed bankruptcy in August, 1987, 
and failed to make monthly payments as 
required under the lease agreement after 
September, 1987. On January 26, 1988, 
LMV's counsel notified the five guarantors 
that MCO had incurred an arrearage in its 
accounts with LMV. None of the guaran-
tors satisfied the indebtedness or made 
payment that could have been applied to 
the indebtedness. On approximately 
March 11, 1988, LMV repossessed the ve-
hicles leased to MCO. Anticipating that 
the proceeds from the sales of the vehicles 
would not be sufficient to satisfy the 
amount owed to it under the contract, LMV 
filed suit to obtain a deficiency judgment 
on April 1, 1988. On April 4, 1988, LMV 
notified MCO and the five individual guar-
antors that LMV would sell the repos-
sessed vehicles commencing April 13, 1988. 
The notice of sale explained that the ve-
hicles were to be sold for the highest possi-
ble price and that the vehicles were then 
and would continue to be located at Nate 
Wade Subaru, a Salt Lake City automobile 
dealership involved in the retail sale of 
used vehicles. The notice declared that the 
vehicles would "be sold in the same manner 
^nd fashion as other used vehicles located" 
at the dealership. 
On May 10, 1988, Nate Wade Subaru 
commenced selling the fourteen vehicles 
that had been repossessed from MCO, with 
the last being sold on June 10, 1988. The 
vehicles were sold in the same manner em-
monthly depreciation value of each car, an ad-
ministration fee, sales tax, and the financing 
charge. The financing charge was derived by 
applying an interest rate of two percent over the 
prime rate as specified by Citibank, New York, 
to the previous month's book value. 
3. All five guarantors were initially named as 
defendants in LMVs deficiency action. The 
other guarantors, however, have settled and do 
not appeal. 
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ployed by the dealership to sell other used 
cars on its lot, namely, by private sale. 
After filing its complaint, LMV moved 
for summary judgment on both liability 
and damages, which motion was denied by 
the trial court. The court then granted 
LMV's subsequent motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of liability. 
Finding no genuine issue as to any material 
fact regarding the liability of defendants 
Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin, and the other 
individual guarantors based on their per-
sonal guaranties, the trial court concluded 
that "LMV leasing is granted judgment 
against [the guarantors] jointly and sever-
ally for any and all amounts owed by MCO, 
Inc. . . . to LMV, which includes any dam-
ages LMV may have suffered in this ac-
tion, pursuant to the Preferred Vehicle 
Lease Agreement entered into between 
MCO and LMV on or about December 29, 
1986." 
When it granted summary judgment as 
to liability, the trial court requested that 
the parties submit affidavits as to the 
amount of damages for which the guaran-
tors were liable to LMV. The guarantors 
and LMV then submitted affidavits regard-
ing the amount of damages incurred by 
LMV. The guarantors objected to LMV's 
affidavit setting forth attorney fees, argu-
ing that the affidavit failed to comply with 
Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. The trial court denied the 
motion to strike the affidavit and entered 
judgment against the Conlins and the other 
defendant-guarantors, jointly and several-
ly, in the amount of $50,500, which included 
$13,500 in attorney fees. 
On appeal, the Conlins claim the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment 
because there were disputed factual issues 
as to (1) whether the Preferred Vehicle 
Lease Agreement was, in fact, a true lease 
or was a security agreement subject to the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("UUCC"); 
(2) whether the sale of the repossessed 
collateral was executed in a commercially 
reasonable manner as required by the 
UUCC; (3) whether the sale of the repos-
sessed vehicles was executed in a commer-
cially reasonable manner as required by 
the contract; (4) whether LMV was barred 
from seeking recovery because it impaired 
the collateral prior to disposal; and (5) the 
amount of damages and LMV's failure to 
mitigate damages. The Conlins also con-
tend the trial court erred in (a) assessing 
the amount of damages by directing the 
parties to submit affidavits and memoran-
da rather than by conducting a trial on the 
issue; and (b) awarding attorney fees when 
LMV's affidavit failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] A trial court may render summary 
judgment only if there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah State Coalition of Senior Citi-
zens v. Utah Power & Light, 776 P.2d 632, 
634 (Utah 1989); Territorial Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). On re-
view of a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts presented and 
the inferences fairly arising therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving par-
ty. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 
714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). In deter-
mining whether the undisputed facts of a 
case entitle the movant to judgment as a 
matter of law, this court gives no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
636 (Utah 1989); see also Bonham v. Mor-
gan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (summa-
ry judgment is, by definition, a conclusion 
of law that is accorded no deference by 
appellate courts); Daniels v. Deseret Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 P.2d 1100 (Utah 
CtApp.1989). 
Likewise, the interpretation of an unam-
biguous contract is a question of law which 
does not require any particular deference 
to the trial court's interpretation of the 
contract Village Inn Apartments v. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 790 
P.2d 581, 582 (Utah Ct.App.1990). We sim-
ilarly view the determination of whether an 
agreement is a lease or a secured sales 
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agreement as a question of law when our 
analysis is based upon the language of the 
agreement itself and not upon extrinsic evi-
dence. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 
714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
III. LEGAL NATURE OF 
AGREEMENT 
[2] The Conlins claim that the trial 
court erred in failing to characterize the 
agreement as a security agreement rather 
than a lease. By arguing that the agree-
ment was a security agreement, the Con-
lins seek to bring the agreement within the 
coverage of the UUCC. Specifically, the 
Conlins argue that, under the UUCC, LMV 
was obligated to dispose of the repossessed 
vehicles in a commercially reasonable man-
ner and any failure to do so bars LMV's 
deficiency action. 
LMV counters this argument by assert-
ing that whether the agreement was a true 
lease or a security agreement is irrelevant 
because a commercially reasonable disposi-
tion of the repossessed vehicles was re-
quired under both the UUCC and the terms 
of the agreement. 
LMV apparently assumes that commer-
cial reasonableness was relevant only at 
the damages phase of the dispute and 
therefore whether the agreement was prop-
erly characterized as a true lease or a 
security agreement was irrelevant to the 
partial summary judgment. LMV's analy-
sis fails to address the crucial issue in this 
case. As is illustrated below, determining 
liability for breach of a lease agreement 
differs dramatically from determining lia-
bility for breach of a security agreement 
under the UUCC. 
[3] If the contract is a true lease agree-
ment, fundamental principles of contract 
law apply to the case, and liability for 
damages is established merely by showing 
a breach of the agreement's provisions.4 
Under the provisions of the agreement, 
failure to dispose of the vehicles in a com-
4. Neither party disputes the fact that MCO de-
faulted in its obligations to pay monthly "rental 
payments" to LMV. If the contract is a true 
lease, this undisputed fact would justify the trial 
mercially reasonable manner goes only to 
the issue of damages. Therefore, if this is 
a lease, commercial reasonableness would 
be irrelevant to liability, and the trial court 
correctly granted LMV's motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
The Conlins argue, however, that if the 
agreement is a security agreement subject 
to the UUCC, LMV's deficiency action 
would have been barred unless it disposed 
of the repossessed vehicles in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. Accordingly, the 
Conlins argue that the commercial reason-
ableness of the disposition of the collateral 
was a prerequisite to bringing a deficiency 
action, and that if there is a factual dispute 
about commercial reasonableness, summa-
ry judgment on liability was erroneously 
granted. 
The Conlins are correct in their assertion 
that contracts properly characterized as se-
curity agreements are subject to the 
UUCC's requirement that collateral be dis-
posed of in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) 
(1990) contains the UUCC's requirement 
governing the disposal of collateral by a 
secured party and provides: 
Disposition of the collateral may be by 
public or private proceedings and may be 
made by way of one or more contracts. 
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit 
or in parcels and at any time and place 
and on any terms but every aspect of the 
disposition including the method, man-
ner, time, place and terms must be 
commercially reasonable. 
(Emphasis added). 
Generally, a secured party's failure to 
dispose of collateral in a commercially rea-
sonable manner precludes that party from 
maintaining a deficiency action. Haggis 
Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management, 
Inc., 745 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1985); Pio-
neer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 
649 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1982); FMA Fin. 
Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 807-
08 (Utah 1979).5 Thus, if the agreement in 
court's entry of partial summary judgment on 
the liability issue. 
5. There is some question as to the continued 
validity of the rule that a creditor cannot recov-
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the present case is a security agreement, 
the question of commercial reasonableness 
would have been relevant to the trial 
court's finding of liability for any subse-
quent deficiency. Therefore, the threshold 
question in our analysis of this case is 
whether the agreement entered into by the 
parties was, in fact, a true lease agreement 
or a security sales agreement subject to 
the requirements of the UUCC. Because 
in granting LMV's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, the trial court did not 
clearly state its conclusion as to the nature 
of the agreement, we must now determine 
its true nature. 
In this case, the language used by the 
parties repeatedly manifested their intent 
that the agreement was a lease. The 
agreement was entitled "Preferred Vehicle 
Lease Agreement." LMV was referred to 
as lessor; MCO was denominated lessee. 
Payments made under the agreement were 
called rent payments. The language of the 
agreement, i.e., the form of the agreement, 
would therefore support the conclusion 
that this was a lease. This is not the end 
of our inquiry however, we next look at the 
purpose of the agreement, i.e., its function. 
[4] In determining the nature of an 
agreement purporting to be a true lease, 
courts must look behind the form of an 
agreement to determine whether it is, in 
fact, a sales agreement with a reservation 
of a security interest in the vendor. See, 
er a deficiency when the creditor has failed to 
dispose of collateral in a commercially reason-
able manner. In Cottam v. Heppner, 111 P.2d 
468, (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court af-
firmed a trial court's determination that the 
secured party had disposed of collateral in a 
commercially reasonable manner. Accordingly, 
the court did not address the question whether 
commercially unreasonable disposition would 
have barred a deficiency action. Justice Zim-
merman suggested, however, that "[t]he conse-
quences of a creditor's failure to comply fully 
with the [commercial reasonableness] require-
ments of section 70A-9-504(3) have not been 
definitively settled in Utah." Id. at 474 n. 4. 
Noting that there are three divergent lines of 
cases addressing the possible effects of a credi-
tor's failure to appropriately dispose of collat-
eral, Justice Zimmerman suggested that Utah 
courts have taken each of the three positions 
and therefore concluded that "[t]his is a ques-
tion that remains open in Utah." Id. 
e.g., Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 
706, 709 (Utah 1981) (if transaction pur-
ports on its face to be lease but is, in fact, a 
security agreement, it is subject to the law 
of sales). However, when the interpreting 
court finds no dispositive evidence that the 
parties intended the agreement to be other 
than what it purports to be by its unambig-
uous terms, that court should decline to 
construe the agreement contrary to those 
terms. As this court has previously ob-
served, "Where questions arise in the inter-
pretation of an agreement, the first source 
of inquiry is within the document itself. It 
should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with its purpose. All of its 
parts should be given effect insofar as that 
is possible/' Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 
1359 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
The starting point in determining wheth-
er an agreement is a true lease or a securi-
ty agreement disguised as a lease is to 
aPply the definitional provisions of the 
UUCC. The UUCC applies to "any trans-
action (regardless of its form) which is 
intended to create a security interest in 
personal property." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-102(l)(a) (1981). The UUCC de-
fined "security interest" at the time of this 
agreement as follows: 
"Security interest" means an interest in 
personal property or fixtures which se-
cures payment or performance of an obli-
gation. . . . Unless a lease or consign-
In Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Cur-
ley, 782 P.2d 536 (Utah Ct.App.1989) this court 
affirmed a trial court's determination that the 
Sale of a truck which secured a note was com-
mercially reasonable. Id at 542. This court, in 
a footnote, explained that because the disposi-
tion of the collateral involved in that case was 
Commercially reasonable, the court would not 
i-each the question whether a failure to dispose 
Of collateral in a commercially reasonable man-
lier would have barred a deficiency judgment. 
Id at 539 n. 4. - However, the court referred to 
Justice Zimmerman's footnote in Cottam and 
Acknowledged that the question might still be 
Unresolved. Id 
In the present case, because we conclude that 
the agreement between LMV and MCO was a 
true lease and not a security agreement, it is 
likewise not necessary to determine whether a 
Secured party's failure to dispose of collateral in 
<i commercially reasonable manner absolutely 
precludes a deficiency action under the UUCC. 
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a true lease or a 
tion of title thereunder is not a "security 
interest" Whether a lease is intend-
ed as security is to be determined by the 
facts of each case; however, (a) the inclu-
sion of an option to purchase does not of 
itself make the lease one intended for 
security, and (b) an agreement that upon 
compliance with the terms of the lease 
the lessee shall become or has the option 
to become the owner of the property for 
no additional consideration or for a nom-
inal consideration does make the lease 
one intended for security. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(37) (1980) 
(emphasis added) (amended 1990). 
Under this statute, for a contract to be 
characterized as a security agreement un-
der the UUCC, the parties to the agree-
ment must so intend, and that intent is 
determined according to the facts of each 
case. 
The only objective characteristic identi-
fied by the above-quoted statute as affect-
ing the determination whether an agree-
ment is a true lease or a security agree-
ment is the inclusion of a provision trans-
ferring ownership upon compliance with 
the terms of the lease or the inclusion of an 
option to purchase for no additional consid-
eration, or for only nominal consideration. 
Mere inclusion of an option does not neces-
sarily constitute a security agreement; the 
option must be for only nominal considera-
tion or for no additional consideration, in 
which case it is presumed to be a security 
agreement. The present agreement con-
tains no option to purchase, and neither 
party has alleged the existence of parol 
evidence to the contrary. Therefore, we 
must discern the intent of the parties as 
manifested by the remaining terms of the 
agreement. G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 
P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("The car-
dinal rule is to give effect to the intentions 
of the parties and, if possible, to glean 
those intentions from the contract itself.''). 
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. 
Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court enumerated 
several relevant factors in determining 
security agreement: 
Numerous factors bear on determining 
whether the terms of an agreement show 
that it was meant to be a lease or a 
security agreement Among others, 
those factors are whether (1) the lessor is 
a financier, (2) the lessee is required to 
insure the goods in favor of the lessor, 
(3) the lessee bears the risk of loss or 
damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the taxes, 
repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agree-
ment establishes default provisions gov-
erning acceleration and resale, (6) a sub-
stantial non-refundable deposit is re-
quired, (7) the goods are to be selected 
from a third party by the lessee, (8) the 
rental payments were equivalent to the 
costs of the goods plus interest, (9) the 
lessor lacks facilities to store or retake 
the goods, (10) the lease may be discount-
ed with a bank, (11) the warranties usual-
ly found in leases are omitted, and (12) 
the goods or fixtures are impractical to 
remove. 
Id. at 487 (citing J. White & R. Summers, 
Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 882-83 (2d ed. 1980)); 
see also Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 
P.2d 706, 710 (Utah 1981) (setting forth 
three tests for determining whether an 
agreement purporting to be a lease is a 
purchase and sale agreement with reserva-
tion of a security interest). 
We note that, in setting forth this list, 
the supreme court, by its own language, 
did not purport to assemble an exhaustive 
list of factors that may be considered in 
characterizing a contract as a lease or as a 
security agreement. Nevertheless, this 
partial list is a useful point of reference for 
our analysis in this case. 
Many of the twelve factors set forth in 
Colonial Leasing are found in the present 
agreement. MCO was required to provide 
insurance, and bore the ultimate risk of 
loss for any uninsured amount. MCO was 
obligated to pay the taxes as well as the 
repair and maintenance costs for the leased 
vehicles. The agreement included default 
provisions regarding acceleration and re-
sale. The rent payments were roughly 
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equivalent to the cost of the vehicles plus 
interest. LMV lacked facilities for storing 
or retaking the automobiles. Finally, the 
agreement specifically excluded any of the 
warranties typically found in leases, i.e., 
fitness for purpose, merchantability, and 
quality. 
Despite the presence of these several 
factors, other aspects of the agreement 
demonstrate the clear intention of the par-
ties that the agreement was nevertheless 
intended to be a true lease agreement. 
Most notably, there is no provision, either 
explicit or implicit, for transfer of owner-
ship of the vehicles to MCO. "The prime 
essential distinction between a lease and a 
conditional sale is that in a lease the lessee 
never ovms the property." Ford v. Rollins 
Protective Serv. Co., 171 Ga.App. 882, 322 
S.E.2d 62, 64 (1984) (emphasis added). The 
agreement specifically provides for reten-
tion of title in LMV, the lessor, which is the 
"paramount attribute of a lease." Carlson 
v. Tandy Computer Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 
395 (8th Cir.1986). Moreover, the agree-
ment includes no alternate provision for 
transfer of ownership such as an option to 
purchase at nominal or no additional con-
sideration. Nor is there any indication that 
the lessee would receive the functional 
equivalent of ownership.6 
Additionally, ownership tax benefits un-
der the lease were reserved exclusively to 
the lessor, another traditional indication 
that the parties intended to enter a true 
6. We do not imply here that the only circum-
stance in which an agreement purporting to be 
a lease may be construed as a security agree-
ment is when it includes a purchase option at 
nominal or no additional consideration. Sec-
tion 70A-1-201(37) permits a conclusion that an 
agreement is intended as a security agreement if 
the lessee receives only the functional equiva-
lent of ownership. Among the functional equiv-
alents which could indicate the intent of the 
parties to execute a security agreement is when 
the lease term period is approximately equal to 
the life of the leased goods. 
See, e.g., 68 Am.Jur.2d Secured Transactions 
§ 120, 963 n. 48 (1973) (noting that ownership 
is typically demonstrated by a purchase option 
at a nominal price but that "[i]t is possible that 
a lease arrangement may also be considered a 
secured transaction if the lease is for a term 
equal to the life of the equipment at rentals that 
would be cumulatively sufficient to pay in full 
for the price of the equipment"); see also Centu-
lease agreement. See, e.g., American 
Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement 
Co., 643 F.2d 248, 266 (5th Cir.1981) (hold-
ing that lessors retention of investment tax 
credit on purportedly leased property mani-
fested intent of parties to enter true lease 
agreement); Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 
487. 
Because we conclude that there is no 
dispositive indication on the face of the 
document that the parties intended to exe-
cute a security agreement, we defer to the 
language of the unambiguous instrument. 
Accord Carlson, 803 F.2d at 395 (intent of 
parties expressed by consistent use of 
"lease language"); American Standard 
Credit, 643 F.2d at 266 (principle of func-
tion over form does not authorize the 
courts to ignore the terms of an agreement 
a/together). 
We therefore conclude as a matter of law 
that the contractual agreement between 
LMV and MCO1 was a true lease. Because 
neither party disputes MCO's default in its 
monthly rent payment obligations, it fol-
lows that the trial court properly granted 
LMV's motion for partial summary judg-
ment as to the guarantors liability for 
MCO's deficiency. 
IV. COMMERCIAL REASONABILITY 
[5] Because we have concluded that the 
agreement was a true lease, we need not 
rian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d at 710 ("a lease 
agreement is actually a purchase and sale agree-
ment if the 'lease payments' are clearly designed 
to establish an ownership interest in the 'les-
see* ")• 
In the present agreement, the lease term was 
forty-eight months and neither party could ex-
tend the lease term. Although the lease pay-
ments mighl arguably have equalled the full 
price of the vehicles after the full lease term, the 
lessee could unilaterally terminate the lease at 
any time after twelve months. Therefore MCO 
was not absolutely obligated to pay the full 
purchase pnee of the vehicles, as it would have 
been under a security sales agreement. More-
over, neither party has argued that the life of 
the automobiles was limited to the forty-eight 
month lease term. By the express terms of the 
agreement, the lessor, not the lessee, would re-
tain the significant post-termination value of the 
vehicles. 
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address the Conlins' second claim that the 
trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment because there remained a disputed 
factual issue as to whether LMV disposed 
of the collateral in a commercially reason-
able manner as required by the UUCC. 
The UUCC does not control this case inas-
much as we have concluded that the agree-
ment was a true lease. 
The Conlins also argue that partial sum-
mary judgment should not have been 
granted because there remained disputed 
factual issues regarding whether the ve-
hicles were disposed of in a commercially 
reasonable manner as required by the lease 
agreement. Section 19 of the agreement 
sets forth the procedure to be followed by 
the parties upon termination of the lease 
agreement for any car: "At the end of the 
Base Lease Term of any vehicle or upon 
the termination of the lease . . . by Lessor, 
or upon the exercise by Lessee of its right 
to retire any vehicle from service . . . Les-
sor will sell it at wholesale in a commercial-
ly reasonable manner." Relying on this 
provision, the Conlins now argue that, even 
though the agreement is a true lease, 
LMV, as lessor, was obligated to dispose of 
the vehicles upon termination of the lease 
agreement in a commercially reasonable 
manner. 
Even assuming that there remained dis-
puted factual questions about LMV's fail-
ure to dispose of the vehicles in a commer-
cially reasonable manner, such questions 
could not have precluded summary judg-
ment as to liability. Under the provisions 
of the lease agreement, any failure to dis-
pose of the vehicles in a commercially rea-
sonable manner was not anticipated to be 
an absolute bar to a suit for any resulting 
deficiency. Therefore, disputed factual is-
sues relating to such failure were not rele-
vant to determining liability. The motion 
for partial summary judgment was limited 
in scope to the issue of liability and be-
cause neither party disputes that MCO de-
faulted in its obligation to pay monthly 
rental payments, the motion was properly 
granted by the trial court. 
V. DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES 
BY AFFIDAVITS AND 
MEMORANDA 
[6] The Conlins argue that the trial 
court erred in determining damages based 
solely on affidavits and memoranda sub-
mitted simultaneously by both parties. 
The Conlins allege a deprivation of their 
right to trial as guaranteed by the due 
process clause of the Utah Constitution. 
They argue that submission of the dam-
ages issue by affidavit and memoranda de-
prived them of the opportunity to submit 
evidence to a trier of fact and to cross-ex-
amine LMV's witnesses. 
We do not reach the merits of this argu-
ment because it was not adequately pre-
served for appeal by a timely objection 
during the trial proceeding. "[I]t is axio-
matic that matters not presented to the 
trial court may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal." Franklin Fin. v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983); see also Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 
46 (Utah Ct.App.1988). This rule applies 
even when an appeal involves constitutional 
issues. See, e.g., Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989) (there is no reason to exempt consti-
tutional claims from application of the rule 
barring appellate review of claims not 
raised at trial); see also, State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 75-80 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (limited 
exceptions to the general rule include ex-
ceptional circumstances, plain error, and 
deprivation of liberty interests). We re-
cently reiterated the policy underlying the 
rule precluding appellate review absent a 
timely objection: 
"If something occurs which the party 
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him 
that he thereafter cannot have a fair 
trial, he must make his objection prompt-
ly and seek redress by moving for a 
mistrial, or by having cautionary instruc-
tions given, if that is deemed adequate, 
or be held to waive whatever rights may 
have existed to do so." Otherwise, "[i]t 
would be manifestly unjust to permit a 
party to sit silently by, believing that 
prejudicial error had been committed" 
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and then "if he loses, come forward" 
claiming error. 
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 
525 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (quoting Hill v. 
Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 58, 377 P.2d 186, 
188 (1962)). 
Although we have serious reservations 
about the procedure employed by the trial 
court in deciding the damages question, we 
are unable to find anything in the record 
indicating a timely objection by the Conlins' 
trial counsel. As appellants, the Conlins 
bear the burden of building a trial record 
adequate to preserve their arguments on 
appeal. See Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 
1045. Furthermore, the Conlins have ad-
vanced no argument that any of the recog-
nized exceptions to the general rule are 
present here. Consequently, we decline to 
reach the merits of the Conlins* argument. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES 
[7] The Conlins also assign as error the 
trial court's denial of their motion to strike 
LMV's affidavit of attorney fees and the 
trial court's subsequent entry of judgment 
for attorney fees in the amount of $13,500. 
The Conlins argue that LMV's affidavit 
failed to comply with Rule 4-505(1) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration in 
that the affidavit failed to specify the hour-
ly rate charged by the attorneys who 
worked on the case. Rule 4-505(1) pro-
vides: 
Affidavits in support of an award of at-
torneys' fees must set forth specifically 
the legal basis for the award, the nature 
of the work performed by the attorney, 
the number of hours spent to prosecute 
the claim to judgment, or the time spent 
in pursuing the matter to the stage for 
which attorneys' fees are claimed, and 
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services, The affidavit 
must also separately state hours by per-
sons other than attorneys, for time 
spent, work completed and hourly rate 
billed. 
The Conlins acknowledge the absence in 
the rule of the requirement that an affida-
vit of attorney fees specify the hourly rate 
charged by each attorney working on the 
case. They rely, however, on two recent 
decisions of this court, Talley v. Talley, 739 
P.2d 83 (Utah CtApp.1987), and Maughan 
v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah CtApp. 
1989), for the proposition that the reason-
ableness of fees cannot be established ab-
sent specification of the hourly rate 
charged by each attorney. 
In Talley, this court reversed a trial 
court's award of attorney fees in a divorce 
case. In determining the reasonableness 
of the amount of requested attorney fees, 
the court suggested that there must be 
some evidence "regarding the necessity of 
the number of hours dedicated, the reason-
ableness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accom-
plished, and the rates commonly charged 
for divorce actions in the community." Id. 
(quoting Kerr v Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 
1384-85 (Utah 1980)). 
In Maughan, this court reiterated the 
standard set forth in Talley and affirmed a 
trial court's award of attorney fees. We 
deferred to the trial court's judgment re-
garding the number of attorney hours re-
quired to bring the case to judgment Id. 
There was no discussion, however, regard-
ing the hourly rate of the attorneys. 
Nothing in either Talley or Maughan 
suggests that the party seeking attorney 
fees must specify the hourly rate billed by 
each attorney working on the case in order 
to fully comply with Rule 4-505(1). So 
long as the legal basis of the award, the 
nature of the work performed by the attor-
neys, the number of hours spent to prose-
cute the claim, and some affirmation that 
the fees charged are reasonable in light of 
comparable legal services are included in 
the affidavit submitted by the party re-
questing the fees, there is no failure to 
comply with Rule 4-505(1). While an hour-
ly rate would likely be helpful to the trial 
court, we decline to imply a requirement 
that the hourly rate for each attorney must 
be specified, tt was therefore within the 
trial court's discretion to accept LMV's af-
fidavit absent the hourly rates of each at-
torney involved. The trial court's denial of 
appellant's Motion to Strike the affidavit of 
STATE v. GARCIA Utah 199 
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attorney fees submitted by LMV is there- certify appeal to the Supreme Court, 
fore affirmed. A. 1953, 76-6-203(2), 78-2-2(3)(i). 
U.C. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We have examined the Conlins* remain-
ing assignments of error and have found 
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we 
affirm both the trial court's grant of 
LMV's motion for partial summary judg-
ment and its entry of final judgment. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v, 
Raymond Victor GARCIA, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 900617-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 23, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Salt 
Lake Third District Court, Michael R. Mur-
phy, J., of aggravated burglary, and he 
appealed. On defendant's motion for certi-
fication to the Supreme Court, the Court of 
Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
appeal and accordingly lacked jurisdiction 
to certify appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Transfer ordered. 
Lynn R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., for plain-
tiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and ORME, 
JJ. (On Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the Court upon 
appellant's motion for certification to the 
Utah Supreme Court, filed 26 December 
1990. Appellee stipulated to the motion. 
Appellant requests that the matter be certi-
fied to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Rule 43, Utah R.App.P. 
Rule 43(a) provides that the Court of 
Appeals may certify matters to the Su-
preme Court in cases over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdic-
tion. The instant matter is an appeal from 
a judgment and conviction of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-203(2) (1989). The Utah Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdic-
tion over appeals involving a conviction of a 
first degree felony.1 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1989). Thus, this court lacks 
jurisdiction over the appeal and accordingly 
lacks jurisdiction to certify the appeal to 
the Supreme Court. 
The notice of appeal herein should have 
designated the Supreme Court, rather than 
the Court of Appeals, as the appellate court 
having jurisdiction of the appeal. As the 
appeal was improperly pursued in this 
Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
matter is transferred to the Utah Supreme 
Court, pursuant to Rule 44, Utah R.App.P. 
Criminal Law <£=1019 
'Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction 
over appeal from judgment and conviction 
of aggravated burglary, a first-degree felo-
ny, and accordingly lacked jurisdiction to 
I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
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1. However, under § 78-2-4 (1989) the Supreme 
Court may transfer non-capital first degree felo-
nies to the Court of Appeals. 
ADDENDUM I I 
- 1 1 -
PFC 291 West 5<tOO South 
Swte 0200 
Murray. Utah B4107 
801/263-2626 
k l A f l HO 
f f C. "L«*or", hereby I * I M I to "te*»e«r, tfvi property deec/fced hereen bob** eccord»ng lo Ihe lermt • 
1. DESCRIPTION OF LEASED PROPERTY: 
Q U A N T I T Y C Q U I f U C N T ( M A N U r A C T U f l C * . MQOCL MO . TYPE. CTC 1 
(1) Sodick Model CNC1W Electrical Discharge Machine 
•Including as additional security The Real Estate owned by Dale L. and 
Grethe Larson as evidenced by a deed of trust dated the £ T&~ day of 
Noveirber 1984, with this lease referred to therein as the underlying 
indebtedness pursuant to Utah code annotated 357-1-31 (as amended). 
i n i t i a l l^ik 
EQUIPMENT WILL BE LOCATED A T : STREET A O O R E S S . 
Kearns 
4845 South 3600 West 
CITY 
INIENOEO USE 
£&_ InftleT >• 
Utah Z I P . 84118 S j l t r^ke" 
Business, Personal, Family or Household 
T N l t l A U 
I have read and agree unconditionally with paragraph 24 on the reverse side hereof which ttatet that any controversy o' 
claim arising out of this contract shall be settled by ARBITRATION in Salt Lake CitY. Utah, and judgment upon ilv! 
award rendered may b« entered in the courts of the State of Utah; and I hereby agree to submit to arbitration J* the 
jurisdiction tor purposes, o( enforcement o< this agreement, a n d a g r e e t o p e r m i t t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f T i t l e 
2. PAYMENT ANO LEASE TERM: 57 of Utah Cede Amotated relating to trust deed forclosures to /pmam 
in ful l force & effect separate and apart from this provision./^ //< 
Security Deposit Refundable at maturity J 
" '94.30 
Ouretion of Lease; 
Due on 2 7 t h 
60 
..months 
day ol tJch El month Qquarter OOther 
At 0 * office* o/ P F C In Sal Lake Cry. 
Piyn^ntth+ynmnq 1 1 — 2 7 1Q ft & 
Neat payment due 1 2 - 2 7
 # 1Q fl4 
Payment amount each period ............. J —L. 
Use Ta* J i 1 ^ t § 7 . 
Total Payment including Use Tax S—2.L 19& ' ^ Z . 
Total FRONT P A Y M E N T including Security Denosit t 4 / 2 1 7 . 9 4 
3. ASSIGNMENT OF W A R R A N T I E S A N O L I M I T ON LESSOR'S L I A B I L I T Y : Neither Ltitor nor any assignee of Lessor shall b« habit (or 4.iy lj.iu*e to 
perform any provition hereof resulting from fire or other casualty, not, Strike o« other It bo/ difficulty, governmental regulation or restriction or any caute b«-
yond Lessor's control. In no event shall Lessor be liable for any loss of profits or other consequential damage or any inconvenience resulting from any ihe ' t , 
damage to. I on of, delect in or failure of the equipment, or the time consumed in recovering, repairing, adiustmg, servicing or replacing me tame and there Hull 
be no abatement or apportionment of rental during such time. LESSOR MAKES NO W A R R A N T Y . EXPRESS OR IMPLIEO. CONCERNING THE EQUIP 
MENT HOWEVER. THIS OOES NOT ABROGATE ANY W A R R A N T Y PROVIOED 8 Y THE M A N U F A C T U R E R , WHICH WARRANTIES AME HEREBY 
ASSIGNED TO LESSEE TO THE E X T E N T PERMITTED BY CONTRACT A N D LAW. 
> 
4. INSURANCE: Lessee, i t its sole cost end expense, shall maintain In full force on all such equipment during the term of this Agreement 
(a) A policy of publl: liability and property damage Insurance protecting tht Inttrtst of Lessor and Lessee with respect to their liability lor iniunei to irmd 
persons and damage lo and lott of use of property of third persons resulting Irom the operation of tht equipment leased hereunder Such public lability and 
property damage insurance shall have limits of not less than J 100.000 per pe*ten and $300 000 for all persons injured or killed in the lame accident and thjil 
also have a limit of not lets than $50,000 for damage, destruction and loss of use of property of third persons as a result of any one accident unlets o«»«e« v»»te here 
Stated. 
(bl A policy of harard insurance Including fire, theft or damage from all other insurable sources on said equipment the deductible amount to be not in 
eecesi of S3 SO Lessee shall stand tht eapanse of said deductiblt amount. The hazard insurance on such equipment shall be for the actual cash value ol the equip-
ment, and m such amounts at the Lessor shell deem adequate. 
PARTIES H A V E REAO THE ABOVE PROVISIONS ANO ALSO PARAGRAPHS 4 T H R O U G H 24 ON THE REVERSE SI0E HEREOF ANO AGREE 
TO BE 0 O U N O BY A L L SUCH PROVISIONS. 
I N WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this instrument on the date below listed. 
Kent Kncwle ^ 972-5774 „ Bob Lucking Contact: 
f S U P P L I E R O F E Q U I P M E N T ( C O M P U X T K AOOft««c | 1 
BTTEPMOJirrAIN MACHINE TOOL 
1090 Pioneer Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 ' 
969-7064 
I F U L L L E G A L N A M E A N O A D O R E S S O F L E 5 S E E I 
Robert J, Lucking & Dale L. Larson dba L & L Wire 
PO Box 168 IXM 
West Jordon, Utah 84084 
( I N C L U O f ZIP C O O f } 
Acctptid by 
L I I N C L U D 6 ZIP C O O t ) 
L E S S E E ( S ) (Sign Below) 
OATE EXECUTED BY LESSEE November 27 , 
f^-sg^2. 
7 L W 
84 
LPASF — 'nuiriuii 
_ L ^ _ i e e
 m ^__ ^ ^ 
(If Corporation President. Vice President or Tteeturer should 
I t Ati shall luiiush lo I essot I copy ol such a? "»policies pnue la taking delivery ot Equipment lessoi slu. * ^ ddilion^l named msweil mi Mi ien.uncil police* M 
any iim< I two* does not na«e evidence ol such cui nsutant* IBSSIM may Heal such liiluic as a default UIWIM ontiaci In (he evmt of inr cam ril u.on ul JUT ol me 
MttMancepaiiriet r e n t e d ftetei* lessee shall give I i , k « tmrnndJKIM)K( el such canceilaiiii* and me uie by ln>w ul I ni«pm«"t •>haitce.ur ^mlany i»nM o« i>nmns m 
• »H«i i ut implied given i t lessee hereunder lo use and upeialc sa»d equipment shall cease uiwMail sutn Misuume h is brent e»«»*d o# icuMced In Hir e. nil Suvh uitmani e is 
not iene wed oi icplaced Equipment shall be mmned lo I essot and Iessot shall have (he tight lo icpasscss Ihe same wiitimit h jhility lot u espasv oi iesnonsibiM» * •"' > rso«-i 110 
dot lu any aitiOelcliinuf attached lo it and I essee spenticoily agrees (aittui his signaim e upon ires document cuiisliimes ins knuwmgw HW«I olii.sng it ioirmmetrswi u 
g(» e him not* c and a hear mo, pr tot to repossession and (b)thal should lessor Keel loputchaselheiequiiediiisiii.JiM-eoitnH all uHesvf I e%sre «.«<« uimnrtfmjmJ ifmhnir 
lessen (oi the cost ol such insurance t essee aqrees lo indemnity and lo save I ts tot haimltss It oni and aqainsl any and ail tn#s damaqes cUms Lauililies ami eipm r .n jny 
manner ammo, out ol Ihe claims m»uiy oe damages lo peiscns ot ptopeily as a i-suM ol lessees operation ul tqutumenl 
AH msiM J4>ce shall be m twee mil only duimq the leim ol lhts lease Nil MI addition thereto liom Ihe lune ol delivery ul cm ipmeni lol essee ami unid ti|inpinnn is • < tinnr I to 
lessoi shail piovidc lot a 10 day pnot written notice lo lessoi ol cancellaiiun ot leritrflMMi in covet age ami sh iiluiuieil the mieieiiot bom I I-SSOI ami l essee m I u«i.,intr.ii «•• 
as ihe case may he shall ptoicct bnih I essot and lessee with respect lo nsk ansing out ol Ihe condition mainiritance ute ot operad/m n< equipment Hie u".« e r h ui j»r 
wsut ance received by 1essoi on account ol ot (oi any loss ot casually winch has been made good by I essee shall I K ielrased lo I essec upon sadsl ailui y \» ool that S J d toss oi 
casually has been made good unless the lesstt is al the Imtt in default ol Ihe payment ol any other liability hetcundet 
5 SUf flllR NOT i n AC(Mf lessee understands and agrees lhat neiiheMuppiici no* any salesman or oihet agemiolsupcliei is an agent ol lessor No salesman <a agent ol 
suppler is authorized lo waive or ailci any lum or condition ol (his lease andno tcpiestnialtOQ aslo Equipment w any oihei mallet by supplier snail tn any way alltcl leasee s 
duly lo pay the icnl and pcilotm ris oiner obligations at sei lotth m INs lease . 
ft OftOf ftllfi tQUlFMf it f I essot agrees lo order Equipment from Supplier upon Ihe lermi and conditions ol Ihe purchase ordi r initially attached hei eio lesser agrees lo an ange 
loi actively ol Equipment so that il can be accepted witlunnNiely days alter the dale ol this lease Anyot attexcepiiunsio l u l l and lOMPU t l delivery ul the emu tscheiKj'eol 
equipment as above shown is below slated by lessee in space provided It space is loll "Wank"by lcs,ui it it luily understood and agieedihai lessee heieby accepts lull and 
complete lesponsibitily lot Equipment scheduled and heieby stipulate* Hut Delivery and Accapianci is willioul exception complete 
7 SUMMIT StCUHITT MO SCGUftlTT flCFfll IT. Trie guaranty SKut ily and ttcuniy deposit if any guarantees (fie fuN petloimanca of the tease and sfta'l be relumed to lessee 
upon the normal cepuadon of this lease The primary purpose ot Ihe guaranty and security deposit is to protect lessor «i the f*tnt of a default guarantee the letum ol me 
equipment HI good condition reasonable weat and (ear excepted and provide security lot Ihe payment ol costs of repairs repossession and/or delaull eipense s an J penalties H 
any security deposit remains alter Hie payment oi Ihe costs oi < el urn of equipment, me tepati oi Ihe same and other delaull expenses and penalties men I essoi may iypty i'»» 
ticess lo unpaid lease payments and DAMAGES. 
I X t f l tM USI.alllRAtlORS lessee at its eipensi shall keep Equipment MI good working condition and repair and furnish all taoor parts mecnanumt ana devices «eau.r«d 
thceiot lessee shall use fquipment m a carelui and lawful manner lessee shaft not make any alterations additions or improvements 10 equipment *iinoui lessui s P"o< 
written consent AH conditions and improvements made to Equipment thai belong lo lessor and shall nol be icmoved without lessor s prior wniien konsem 
9 OW«(«SMlf» FOIIQMU MOff ITT fqmpmentrt and shall at aH times remain the properly o i l essoi and lest re shall have no ughl title OMnie»esiiheieinoiineftioe«ceoi 
as n pies sly set foilh m this lease Equipment t* and shall al all limes be and remain personal ptopeily notwithstanding inal Iquipment oi any pait iheieoi may no« be or 
her caller become tn any mtnntt alfucd ot attached lo real ptopeily oi any building thereon 
10 m u n i t i o n Of U1S< M 8 KUUM OF f Wft ITT Subiect to Option lo Purchase (see paragraph I I ) al the O P * an on ol INs lease ot upon demand by lessoi made put suam 
lo Ihe default provisions heieol lessee alitscipcnsc ShallrctuinEquipmentingoodwotkingcsnrVilionandrepair py deliveung it packed and teady (or shipmem losuchpiace 
ot on ooaid such canter as lessor may specify If purchase by lessee ot return ol Equipment is nol elleclcd wiirvn 30days oi maturity ol this lease lessee agicts to cuuimuc 
normal monthly rent payments lo lessor until Equipment is etiner purcnased ot returned to lessor 
I I OHrflM TO PURCHASE lessee shall have an option lo purchase Equipment at the end ol Ihe lease period lot f AIR MAHhE I VAiuE al thai lime plus all obligation* < tmaim»g 
due undei this lease Notice ol eiercisc ol this option must be given MI writing lo lessor ot I essot s assignee ail Musi Ihn ty t30» days prior toiheeipiialionui the (rase litis 
option shall termMiate and be avoid upon letnvnation ol this lease by reason of lessees deiautl 
1? XlCMf TO f tOTECT {QUff MCKf II lessee tails to maintain insurance pay l a m Assessments costs and an> e»pense vihich I essee is heieundenequnedio pay lessor may 
make eip<ndttures tot Such purposes and Ihe amounts SO expended srvalt become tcnmediaiely due and pay-ijle by lessee to lessor lessor snait have ih< ng'd io mspeii 
Equiomeia at any teasonabtc lune ot placi 
13 0(ftUlT I T U J I H In iht event lessee Mes or there is earned lobe Med a petition in bankruptcy or shallmakeorhavemade an assignment lor ihebet»eiitofcitdiiois o> J 
a receiver shall be appointed lor (essec or il lessee shall have permitted ot sullcied any attachment levy execution I O L I made levied or entered against or <n any iesfiM on 
any ot all oi lessee s propeity ot lails lo pertorm any oiher oWnialiOfl oi INs I case (except payment ol rent ot in^inienani.t ul insurance which are dead wan ncieuii then upon 
lrv« (Si days written notice by lessor to lessee, lo coneci me deiaufl ihe tight ol lessee under INs lease shafl iheretipon expne 
Many event mat lessee fads to make any payment duo and owmg hereunder for a period of fifteen (1$i days after such payment is dui then the ngnts o i l essee undei m«s 
Agreement shall thereupon expire. Any extension ol iimt or other alteration «i contract lerms allowed by lessor shall not deprive it oi any ot its ngnts ncieunoei 
14 QAMACE! tn the event that lessee lads lo pcrloem m accordance wtdi the terms and conditions ol this leas t and the i ights ol t essee hei eundei eipue me lessee jg< tes io 
pay to Irssot any and att amounts Of unpaid monthly payments computed to ihe date of return of such piopctty together with any loss or damage which lessor may sutler as a 
result of (he breach of lhts lease by Lessee if being mutually agreed between (essoe and Ihe lessee that the immmuin 1 mount oi such ioss as a result ol any smh Breach as 
liquidated damages dui »nd payable on the dale of expiration oi this I ease shaft be J sum equal to one trued) oi ine monthly payments mat wouiJ nave bttn paid it me I ease had 
continued m full force and effect Iqi Ihe pcrwd tel forth tn Paragraph 2 above wtinoul consideration oi ihe *hoiienin<) oi Ihe leim by reason ol delaull 
Die lailutc ol lessoi at any time lo exercise its tights under this paragraph MI me event ol any such delaull by I esseeshallnot ailrct us tight and powet to neicise su< n ngms 
in the event ol any subsequent default for the purpose ol t eposse ssmg Equipment lessor may etilcr upun any ptemises oi H essee wheic Equipment may be and remove the same 
and lessee hereby waives any claim (or trespass Of damage occasioned thereby 
lessee shall bear the entire risk, ot loss theft, desliuctton or damage of Equipment ot any item Ihoieol (herein loss or Damage I liom any cause whatsoever No loss or 
damage or malfunction ol Equipment shall relieve lessee oi ihe oofigalioti to pay rent ot any other obligation under INs lease tn the event ol toss ot damage lessee al me opdon 
ol lessor shall la) place ihe same in good condition and repair or ibl replace the same with like equipment m gnod condition and repau with deai title met em to (essu* or u t pay 
to lessor the total ol the following amounts dl the total rent due and owing at the time ol Such payment plus (m the p eseni value (at the Sail I ate Ciiy cunent tun* u i t ol 
mterestl ol all rent and other amounts payable by lessee with respect to said item from date ol such payment lo date ul e ipir anon ol Ihe then current term ol this lease plus '"•> 
the tesiduai vajua which said item would have had al tne end oi the term Upon lessor s receipt oi such payment lessrt and/or lessee s insurer shall he emitted to lessoi s 
interest in said Hem (or salvage purposes, in m Inen condition and location as is. without warranty express or implied 
15 I f U Q I S E l f d S t S I essee shall pay lessor alt costs and cipenses including late payment assessments reasonable attorney sfes the fersolrollet tion agencies ->'•«• -»" 
other cipenses oi collection such as telephone and telegraph charges Mxuncd by lessoi MI cniuicing any ol lite lerms COIMIIIHIIIS OI provisions heieol 
16 IQI CIS Any not«e requited to be given hereunder shall be deemed completed live (Si days altet posting with potljqe pi epaid MI tegutai ot ceiiiliedU S maiiiue^huliiie 
patties al their respective addresses indicated m the initial paragraph oi this least 
17 A ME HOME I IS. Any amendment to this lease must be m*dt HI writing signed and daied by the patties and attuned lo lhts least 
11 1ICN1S TO ASSJM IEASE. 
lai l essee agi ees that 1 essot may assign att or any pan of the monies and claims (or monies due and to bet ome due to I essot and all other rights oi I e<sor under mis lease 
Ugmi rer npt of written notice of assignment leasee shall pay lo assignee alt moncs as ihey become due tinder this I cas t lessee s obligation to QI\ said monies io ine ass*)i«t 
snjtl oe unconditional and shall not be subject lo any defense or oflsel unless ot unlit assignee notifies tessr-e in writing inal Ims I ease has been reassigned bat k tole^or 
(hllessec agrees Ihain will nol assign transfer sublet ot lease its r*jhis under INs I ease and will nol pledge inongacic or otherwise encumber ot suoiettiu ot pcimiitnciisi 
upon or be subjected to any lien o* chaige any tight ot Miteiesl ot lessee hereunder without lessor s pi KM wniien consent 
l» lOCATldaj lESSflfX IMS'ICTIOH. IAIEIS Equipment shall be delivered and thereafter kept at the location :p«ili<d above or if none is specified at lessees addiessset 
lorth above and shall not be removed Iherelioin without lessor s prior written consent lessor shall hi^t Ihe right lo inspect Equipment at any ic asonable time H lessoi 
supplies lessee wun labels slating thai Equipment is owned by lessor lessee shatt alln and keep same m a prominent place on each iiem oi Equipment 
?0 TfUktHAnonau/tlUCTErlkt THIS IEASE MAY HO! 81 fERMINAfEDPWOli IQl lSEXf lJUlWNUYl l fHIRFAHir i (CCIM lltAI USSOflMAr rtllMlNAlt lltl ACIMEMINl 
UrOK OlfAUir aY I t S S H AS SrAIEU HEHElnl 
21 IATE CMAICE It I essee fatts lo pay when due rent ot other amount requwed herein lo be p»d by I esser t essre sh.iN pay lo I essoi a laic chaiqe ol live peicmt iS t ol r J< n 
mslailment or part theieol lot which said tent or other amount shall be delinquent ot Si 00 whichever is greater plus Mite i est on such delinquent rent oi other amount liom tr* due 
dale thereof until paid at me rate of I f . per annual both before and altet any judgment that may be icmleied ** l.ivor ol lessoi against lessee on said sums 
22 l i t * ! T l l l l lesset shaft keep Equipment fret and clear of art levies hens and encumbrances lessee shall MI the manner dwected by lessoi |a| make and lite J(> 
dectiialiens and returns m connection with all charges and taies (local stale and loderai) which may now or heiealtet he imposed upon ni mcasuicd uy the ownet sh<p leasing 
rental sale puicrtase possession or use ol Equipment excluding, huwevee att taies on tr measured by lessut s net income and |h| p^y all such chaiqcs and taies 
K lessee lads lo discharge said levies kens and encumbrances ot lo pay said charges and laics lessor shall have the right but shaft nol be obligated io ti led sucn 
discharge or pay such charges and taxes In that event lesset shal icpay ha lessor tne cost I heieol with the ncit payment ol tent 
23 TA1IEIEUTS if iNVESTMENriAXCAEDIE is passed Itomlassotlo lessee if must be by written consent of I essot and ui that event if I essot rs caused by I essee s default 
M oiiiu action of lessee at variance with tins assignment or by government action to saennca Investment la« 0edits depreciation or ihe loss ol any uirwi \n Ur.iHitN m 
wiwch | i \ toi it omjinaity emitted I essee egrets to mdemmly I essoi aga*ntl itieu lasses Tms wilt be (he ditlireiKC between l essot s laa liability betui e io»t oi u< beixl>u J»d 
Ihe ti4lMkiy datciimnee lo e«i>i altet lessoi s lots ot tax binelits 
21 1I I I IJUTWI ANY COHIROVERSY Ofl a A t M AftlSJNG OUf Of OH HCUIING TO THIS r.OKfAAC? OR TltT RftEAOl fHEREOf SHAll BE SEUlEO Ht AH8HRAI10N IN 
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